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Abstract
The nature and politics of urban development in Auckland have undergone rapid
transformation following amalgamation of eight separate authorities in 2010. Institu-
tions governing metropolitan planning and infrastructure provision were rescaled to
form the Auckland Super City Council in 2010, with an ambitious vision to become
the world’s most liveable city and ongoing political contestation between the local
and central government. Amalgamation of Auckland’s governance was conceived and
imposed by the central government as part of a broader economic strategy centred
on ”competitive cities”. However, Auckland Council’s first strategic plan adopted a
contrasting agenda, centred around the goal of ”liveability”. Auckland’s recent devel-
opments illustrate the challenges of a distinctly post-suburban polity. The majority of
employment is located in suburban areas and the city has variegated and overlapping
patterns in spatial form generated through inconsistent infrastructure interventions
across local and national authorities. Conflicting urban policy agenda at national and
local scales shows a tension between the pursuit of economic development and pro-
vision for collective needs. The politics of post-suburban development create specific
challenges for Auckland’s governance. s Liveability and economic competitiveness are
treated as complementary terms in political rhetoric, however trade-offs emerge at
a smaller spatial scales. Public concern over housing affordability and risks to the
financial stability of New Zealand’s economy have led to central government interven-
tion and renegotiation of authority between different tiers of government for land use
and infrastructure provision. Auckland’s position as New Zealand’s largest city and
economic centre frequently blurs the distinction between issues of local and national
significance. Auckland’s governance challenges are not unique, however the current
tensions are exacerbated by its dominance in a small and geographically-isolated na-
tion.
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1. Background
Auckland has a population of 1.57 million across approximately 560 km2
(Statistics New Zealand, 2015b). The region’s geography is unusual: Auckland
is centred on an isthmus, punctuated by approximately fifty volcanic cones with
sheltered harbours to the east and west. 34% of New Zealand’s population5
live in Auckland, and the city generates 35% of New Zealand’s gross domestic
product (Statistics New Zealand, 2015a,b). Auckland’s spatial form is relatively
dispersed, with higher residential and employment density in the city centre,
and lower-density residential and employment patterns extending from the city
fringe to the urban periphery. Auckland has expanded far beyond the isthmus10
to the north and south, engulfing a number of historically-separate settlements.
Across Auckland’s history, the region has experienced ongoing economic and
social transformation. Auckland (formerly known as Ta¯maki-makau-rau) was
historically a productive agricultural area, with access to two harbours and fer-
tile soil due to the region’s volcanic activity. In 1740 the indigenous Ma¯ori pop-15
ulation was approximately 10,000, however tribal conflict meant that by 1826
there was no remaining residential settlement on the isthmus (Pownall, 2008).
Following the arrival of European colonists, the city was selected as the capital
of the New Zealand colony in 1841 (Bloomfield, 1967). Auckland’s geographical
advantage made it a favourable location for settlement during the early years of20
colonisation. New Zealand had limited inland transport infrastructure and sea
transport was essential for trade between regions. Auckland grew quickly, as it
was well-equipped to support trade with protected harbours on both coastlines
and also served as the country’s administrative centre. Despite the transfer of
the capital city to Wellington in 1865, Auckland’s population increased further25
to 12,500 by 1864, and 58,000 by 1881 (Bloomfield, 1973). By 2015 Auck-
land’s population of 1.57 million dwarfed New Zealand’s next largest city of
Christchurch, with only 370,000 residents. Auckland’s growth took place un-
der fragmented governance and different jurisdictions competed aggressively to
assert dominance over regional planning decisions and fundraising capabilities30
(Bush, 1990).
As a former British colony, New Zealand’s population growth and chang-
ing ethnic composition has been heavily shaped by migration over the past 180
years. Immigration reform in the late 1980s led to even greater ethnic diver-
sity, particularly in urban centres. Fig. 1 shows the components of population35
growth in Auckland between 19972015. Significant, but volatile, international
in-migration contrasts with net domestic out-migration, which has heavily in-
fluenced Auckland’s ethnic composition. Forty percent of Auckland’s current
residents were born outside New Zealand, and the city is more diverse than
London and Los Angeles (Bruce, 2014).40
Auckland’s large variety of cultures include 213 different ethnic groups, and
the largest urban population of indigenous Ma¯ori. Efforts by local institutions
to support Auckland’s diversity, including public celebrations around Matariki
(Ma¯ori New Year), Chinese New Year and Diwali, have reinforced Auckland’s
identity as a cultural melting pot that brings benefits for all residents (Johnson45
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Figure 1: Components of population growth in Auckland (Statistics New Zealand, 2015b)
& Moloughney, 2007). Auckland’s Ma¯ori heritage and population have partic-
ular significance for governance and planning. A large share of New Zealand’s
Ma¯ori population migrated to urban centres over the 20th century, accompanied
by policies which undermined social structures and cultural practices (Barcham,
1998). Currently, urban Ma¯ori experience poorer outcomes for education, hous-50
ing quality, and health in New Zealand cities and urban governance faces a
challenge to recognise the needs and heterogeneity across urban Ma¯ori popula-
tions (Gagne´, 2016; Ryks et al., 2016).
1.1. Urban governance in New Zealand
The absence of an overarching urban policy in New Zealand has largely55
left urban issues to relevant sector-based policies around infrastructure provi-
sion, land use, and economic development (Zo¨llner, 2004). Over the 20th cen-
tury local politics in Auckland were prone to dysfunction, pork-barreling and
parochial interests (Bloomfield, 1973; Edgar, 2012). In the context of parochial-
ism and political dysfunction, the preferred governance mechanism for much of60
the 20th century was the ad-hoc board: a specific-purpose entity to manage ser-
vices or infrastructure facilities (Royal Commission on Auckland Governance,
2009). Given the demands of rapid growth, the efficiency of ad-hoc bodies
to deliver infrastructure investments without requiring integrated planning or
consensus across neighbouring jurisdictions made them a popular short-term65
measure. Over the longer term this resulted in a proliferation of separate gov-
erning bodies: by 1960 the region had 31 territorial authorities and 16 ad hoc
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bodies, creating an extremely difficult environment for unified decision-making
(Bush, 1972). Therefore Auckland’s governance structure was driven by expedi-
ence, bowing under pressures to meet the immediate demands of growth rather70
than a unified long term vision. The governance and provision of region-wide
infrastructure was repeatedly undermined by competition between jurisdictions.
Major investments in water sources and reticulation systems, waste water treat-
ment and transit provision were frequently contested and deferred (Harris, 2005;
La Roche, 2011). Often, political consensus was only reached after the deterio-75
ration of infrastructure led to a major failure or crisis (Fitzmaurice, 2009).
The multitude of governing authorities was streamlined by reforms imposed
by the central government. The passing of the Auckland Regional Authority Act
in 1963 led to Auckland’s first region-wide authority, and further amalgamation
of 22 local authorities to seven in 1990 further reduced the number of institutions80
governing Auckland (Bush, 1990). Ongoing renegotiation and hollowing out
of the authority of Auckland’s regional agencies demonstrates the difficulty in
maintaining stable political relationships at the regional scale (Memon et al.,
2007).
1.2. Rescaled governance: Auckland’s Super City project85
Following extended periods of political fragmentation and failed attempts
to reform governance in 1906, 1927, and 1964 (Edgar, 2012; Bloomfield, 1967,
1973; Bush, 1972), four city councils, three district councils and one regional
council were finally amalgamated to form a unitary authority in 2010.
Urban governance is a central instrument by which cities can re-orient them-90
selves around global economic and political networks (Keil, 2000). Reconfigu-
ration of governance reflects both the macro-economic logic or policies, and the
actors and institutions which participate in local governance (Boudreau et al.,
2006). Restructuring of urban governance through amalgamation negotiates
trade-offs between scale and efficiency, alongside imperatives for democratic95
representation and providing for the collective needs of urban populations. .
Auckland’s amalgamation was evidently a product of national economic strat-
egy to strengthen urban economies. However, emerging tensions and the imple-
mentation of new governance mechanisms reflect the contingent assemblages of
actors participating in the city’s governance, albeit with strong influence from100
the central government (Wetzstein, 2008).
Since 2000, the central government showed greater interest in Auckland’s
contribution to the national economy, as the region showed strong economic
growth (Lewis & Murphy, 2015). The central government’s initiative for com-
petitive cities formed a key component of the economic agenda to support pros-105
perity and future growth (Ministry for Local Government, 2009). Auckland was
characterised as the engine room for New Zealand’s economic growth (Ministry
for Local Government, 2009). This shows the strategic role of Auckland for
the central government, not primarily as a population centre, but a vehicle to
support the national economic strategy. Governance reforms were justified by110
imperatives for international competitiveness, Auckland’s significance to the na-
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tional economy, and the desire to better serve interdependent needs for social,
environmental, cultural and economic well-being (Salmon et al., 2009).
The conceptualisation of global cities as strategic units in their own right
(World Bank, 2015) has influenced political discourse and expectations of how115
cities are organised, both economically and socially (Gupta et al., 2015; Sassen,
2005). While the geographic limits of Auckland’s governance are bounded to
560 km2, the scale across which governance networks are influenced, and have
subsequent impacts, is much broader. Success in global liveability rankings
has influenced Auckland’s policy goals, and Auckland’s diversity results in a120
large number of international networks operating through and across the city.
The prospect of amalgamation gained traction following an OECD delegation
visit to New Zealand in 2006, and in 2007 a Royal Commission was set up by
the Labour-led central government to re-examine Auckland’s governance (?). In
March 2009 the Commission’s final report was delivered to the new National-led125
government, recommending a two-tier structure with an overarching authority
and local representation provided through sub-regional elected bodies. The act-
ing government accepted most of the recommendations, with notable omissions
around Auckland’s representation at the central government level, Ma¯ori rep-
resentation on the governing body, and rejection of proposed second-tier local130
councils in place of community boards with limited responsibilities and fundrais-
ing capability. The amalgamation process was swift, managed by the Auckland
Transition Agency between May 2009November 2010.
The amalgamated authority has fewer elected officials, in an effort to im-
prove efficiency, however the relative scale of Auckland Council is substantial.135
With 8000 staff, annual revenues of NZ$2.9 billion (US$2.1 billion) and NZ$26
billion (US $19 billion) of assets, Auckland Council is currently the largest local
government in the southern hemisphere (Chen, 2014; Thomas, 2014).
Auckland’s new institutional arrangements for infrastructure delivery enable
more co-ordinated, strategic planning of investments across the city. However140
the outcomes for democratic representation and public engagement are less cer-
tain. Voter turnout at local elections fell from 51% in 2010 to 35% in 2013
and recovered only slightly to 39% in 2016, suggesting that public have limited
engagement and understanding of the importance of elected officials in Auck-
land’s development (Local Government New Zealand, 2016). An increasing145
democratic deficit in New Zealand is attributed to national reforms which shift
power to the central government, eroding the legitimacy and integrity of local
authorities (Cheyne, 2015). Under-representation of indigenous Ma¯ori in local
governance in New Zealand is an ongoing challenge (Hayward, 2011). Political
representation of Ma¯ori in Auckland takes the form of an independent board150
tasked with ensuring that Auckland Council comply with statutory provisions
in the Treaty of Waitangi1 and advising on issues that affect the Ma¯ori popu-
1The Treaty of Waitangi is New Zealand’s founding document, which governs relations
between indigenous Ma¯ori and non-Ma¯ori populations, and guarantees Ma¯ori rights and priv-
ileges.
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lation. The Royal Commission recommended three Ma¯ori council members on
the governing body, however this was not adopted by the central government,
and Ma¯ori representation remains limited (Gagne´, 2016).155
Rescaling of urban governance is characterised as the rescaling of state power
in response to shifting economic dynamics, which increasingly concentrate at
the scale of the city-region (Brenner, 2011). In Auckland’s case, amalgama-
tion initially appeared to strengthen the city politically by enabling scale and
co-ordination for planning and public investments, and eliminating competition160
for funding between neighbouring jurisdictions. However, in political terms this
has enabled the central government to intervene and influence Auckland to an
extent which may not have been feasible when the city’s governance was dis-
persed across eight different authorities. The incoherent politics of Auckland’s
post-amalgamation development reflect the in-between-ness of post-suburbia.165
Central government intervention and controls over the statutory powers of Auck-
land Council characterise state presence and state retreat from critical housing
and transport issues, and conflicting interventions from local and central state
actors (Young & Keil, 2010; Murphy, 2016).
Auckland’s governance challenges and distinctly post-suburban politics are170
explored in this profile. Rescaling of the city’s governance has revealed the
nature of post-suburbia through the politics of land development and ongoing
contestation over authority, decision-making and accountability for large-scale
infrastructure investments.
2. Post-suburban politics of development175
The post-suburban polity emerges from the evolution of suburbs beyond
their original function as solely residential areas serving commercial activity in
the urban core. Post-suburbia has distinct regional variation, with disparities in
the scale and nature of post-suburban forms between European, North Ameri-
can, and Chinese cities (Phelps, 2010; Wu & Phelps, 2011). Auckland’s suburbs180
have evolved to accommodate greater economic activity and varied land-use pat-
terns shaped by transport infrastructure . While Auckland’s early suburbs were
supported by a network of tramways, the majority of current suburban areas
developed after this network was removed in the 1950s. The mass production
of private automobiles, expansion of roading infrastructure and residential de-185
velopment of greenfield areas produced low-density residential areas extending
into the city’s hinterland (Modarres & Kirby, 2010; Teaford, 2011). Auckland’s
suburbanisation led to a decline in the city centre. Despite a recent resurgence
in population and employment in the city centre, suburban areas still retain
an 84% share of employment (Statistics New Zealand, 2013). This brings a190
broader range of interests to urban politics, beyond the landed interests domi-
nant in urban growth machine and urban regime theory. However following the
emergence of a property market bubble in Auckland in 2013, land ownership is
still an important driver of the politics of development. The increased complex
spatial form of post-suburban areas is generated by the in-between-ness of an195
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urban economy and society (Young & Keil, 2014). Conflicting infrastructure in-
terventions from local and central government, and opposing forces of dispersion
and centralisation, are reflected in Auckland’s disjointed and sprawling spatial
form.
Specific tensions in governing post-suburban areas arise as, several decades200
after initial suburban expansion, urban governance must address global environ-
mental and economic risks. This is characteristic of the second modernity where
critical societal issues emerge at the global scale (Beck, 1992). New urban policy
goals aim to reduce green gas emissions, mitigating the risks of climate change,
incentivise environmentally sustainable land development and travel behaviour,205
and cater for active transport modes challenge the dominant modes of devel-
opment and mobility for suburban areas (Kennedy et al., 2005; Mitchell et al.,
2015). Therefore challenges arise for cities with strong population growth and
imperatives to change the way that land and infrastructure are used.
Auckland’s spatial development and contestation over land use policy illus-210
trate the politics of post-suburban growth. Governance mechanisms are central
drivers of change that enable suburban spaces to be re-worked to adapt to chang-
ing demands and priorities for land use (Phelps, 2015, p.74). The rescaling of
Auckland’s governance impacts on the politics of growth in multiple ways. A
single governing body provided the platform for a new urban policy agenda,215
accompanied by specific tools to implement this agenda through spatial plan-
ning and infrastructure investment. Legislation introduced in 2010 to enable
Auckland’s amalgamation included provisions for a strategic spatial plan, and
created new institutions to integrate delivery of infrastructure services. The
strategic spatial plan, also known as the Auckland Plan, set out the city’s goals220
for the next thirty years, and required transitions to achieve these. Attempts
to implement strategic spatial planning in Auckland show the tensions of gov-
erning post-suburbia: contestation between the pursuit of economic growth and
provision for collective consumption, conflict over how best to accommodate
growth while preserving the quality of the existing environment, and the re-225
sulting pressures on different levels of government to intervene (Phelps et al.,
2010).
2.1. New urban agendas: competitive and liveable cities?
Reform of Auckland’s governance resulted from New Zealand’s national
agenda for international competitiveness. The central government led an initia-230
tive for competitive cities as a key component of the national economic agenda
to support prosperity and future growth (Ministry for Local Government, 2009).
However Auckland’s amalgamation has subsequently enabled a new local agenda
oriented toward liveability and broader social and economic goals.
International trends toward a new urban entrepreneurialism have influenced235
New Zealand’s urban policy since the 1990s (Horton, 1995), treating cities as
economic entities in themselves which can leverage their competitive advantage
(Porter, 1995). The competitive cities strategy utilises land-use policy to foster
spatial agglomeration and greater economic performance. In 2002 the Auck-
land Regional Economic Development Strategy was launched as an initiative of240
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purported national significance, as Auckland’s growth had strong potential to
increase New Zealand’s GDP earnings, as a way to build export markets and
attract foreign investment (Tizard, 2002). Supporting the international com-
petitiveness of New Zealand cities is now a primary component of the central
government’s economic agenda (Ministry for the Environment, 2010). This shift245
in urban policy attributed greater economic significance to the city as the pre-
eminent spatial form to support quality of life and economic growth (Ministry
for the Environment, 2010). While the competitiveness agenda was led by the
central government, Auckland’s goal to become the world’s most liveable city
was introduced by the newly-amalgamated Auckland Council as the overarch-250
ing vision for the Auckland Plan, released in 2012. Auckland’s adoption of
liveability as a policy goal shows how the concept can be appropriated as an
international branding exercise, or alternatively used to shape a more inclu-
sive and equitable urban policy. Ranking highly in the Economist Intelligence
Unit’s Global Liveability Ranking, Mercer’s Quality of Living Survey, and Mon-255
ocle magazine’s Quality of Life Survey is perceived to attract foreign investment
and skilled workers (Auckland Council, 2016b). However the measures adopted
within global rankings take a narrow view on liveability, catering to the specific
needs of high-income, highly skilled individuals with specific lifestyle preferences.
An approach to liveability that focuses solely on attracting skilled workers and260
foreign investment may come at the expense of improving local services and
amenities for existing residents, and the specific needs of elderly, youth and
disabled populations. Liveability is underpinned by the everyday experiences
of people living in cities, and takes many different meanings to different people
(Ley, 1990). The vision set out in the Auckland Plan adopts an inclusive def-265
inition of liveability, aiming to create a strong, inclusive and equitable society
that ensures opportunity for all Aucklanders (Auckland Council, 2012). Real-
ising this definition of liveability depends on the implementation of the Auck-
land Plan into infrastructure investment and spatial planning. While liveability
and competitiveness are often treated as compatible outcomes within political270
rhetoric, there are clear tensions between these goals in post-suburban cities.
The pursuit of economic growth and required provisions for social and physical
infrastructure are related at the regional level, however conflicts and disparities
can arise at the scale of local communities (Cox & Jonas, 1993; Phelps, 2015).
The introduction of the agenda for liveability and competitiveness show that275
the scope of what is governed at the local level has shifted profoundly. The tradi-
tional role of local government authorities has been described anecdotally as the
proverbial three Rs: roads, rubbish and rates (Memon, 2008), reflecting a min-
imal level of responsibility for basic public services. This mandate is expanded
to encompass wide-reaching economic, social and environmental outcomes with280
the agenda for liveability. It is questionable whether local government can ef-
fect change in wider economic, social and environmental outcomes without co-
ordinated planning with other central government agencies (Memon et al., 2007).
Given Auckland’s pressing need to address the standard of housing and trans-
port provision, the imperatives for urban liveability represented an opportunity285
for meaningful change. A 2006 study showed Auckland’s population of severely
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housing-deprived2 people numbered 9800 (Amore et al., 2006). An estimated
14% of Aucklanders live in fuel poverty, due to poor quality, uninsulated hous-
ing, and increases in the real price of electricity (Howden-Chapman et al., 2012).
Beyond the Auckland Plan, there is limited translation of liveability into every-290
day practices and processes for delivering public services. Investments in public
spaces, cycling infrastructure, and waste minimisation programmes have been
successful, however the lack of an over-arching framework to support liveabil-
ity allows unsustainable modes of urban development to continue, particularly
motorway expansion and damage to the natural environment (Salmon, 2016).295
Figure 2: Auckland’s Vision, (Auckland Council, 2012)
Furthermore, the commendable ambitions of the Auckland Plan do not re-
alistically account for the limited authority of the Auckland Plan to influence
existing forms of transport and infrastructure planning, and delivery of social
services (Imran & Pearce, 2015a). Fig. 2 shows the hierarchy of goals, outcomes
and transformational shifts set out in the Auckland Plan.300
In particular, the Auckland Plan’s proposed shift to outstanding public
transport within one network is limited within the current framework of trans-
port investment in New Zealand which has strong and long-standing biases
toward private vehicle travel (Hickman et al., 2014; Imran & Pearce, 2015b;
Mees & Dodson, 2007). Auckland’s public transport network has improved dra-305
matically across the past decade, and central government grants for urban cy-
cleways and rail infrastructure have generated good improvements in providing
safer, sustainable travel choices. Between 20062015, annual transit patronage
increased from 43 million to 60 million bus trips per year, 5.6 million to 15.4
million rail trips, and 4.2 million to 5.7 million ferry trips (Auckland Transport,310
2015). However over the same period, the vehicle ownership rate has increased
from 680 to 700 vehicles per thousand residents (Statistics New Zealand, 2013).
2Severe housing deprivation refers to having no accommodation, non-private accommoda-
tion, or being temporarily resident in a severely crowded private dwelling
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Achieving the vision of the Auckland Plan requires a substantial mode shift to
public transport, walking and cycling to support projected population growth.
Auckland’s attempt to operationalise liveability into land use planning and315
infrastructure provision illustrates the influence of urban policy agendas, and the
distinctly post-suburban nature of the city’s growth and development. Conflict
between economic competitiveness and liveability reflect the divergent interven-
tions across multiples levels of governance and influence of non-landed interests
to shape outcomes of urban development.320
2.2. Transforming the drivers of change
Auckland’s governance reforms included new mechanisms to drive change in
the city’s development. Strategic spatial planning was adopted to support Auck-
land’s growth and liveability. Strategic spatial planning produces a long term
vision, actions to reach that vision, and identifies the means for implementation,325
emphasising transformative change and integrated planning (Albrechts, 2006;
McFarlane et al., 2015). Institutional reform enabled region-wide co-ordination
and planning of public infrastructure investments, however the politics of infras-
tructure in Auckland reflect inconsistent interventions across state actors and
the politicisation of the side effects of second modernity (Young & Keil, 2010).330
2.2.1. Strategic spatial planning and the Auckland Plan
The Auckland Plan’s implications for spatial planning and budgetary allo-
cations were operationalised through the Unitary Plan and Long Term Plan,
respectively. Underpinning the Unitary Plan, Auckland’s population growth
projections anticipated an increase of 700,0001,000,000 new residents over 30335
years (?). The Unitary Plan set out to accommodate this growth using the
compact city approach. Proposed zoning for targeted intensification across a
number of suburban centres and along transit corridors, with improved transit
services to support better accessibility and reduce automobile dependence. The
Unitary Plan has been the locus of ongoing political and public debate across340
different stages of development. The draft Unitary Plan was published in March
2013, followed by the Proposed Auckland Unitary Plan (PAUP) in September
2013. A streamlined process for consultation involved an Independent Hearings
Panel set up by the central government, hearing submissions from the public,
business interests, civil society and community groups, as well as government345
departments.
Despite apparent support for intensified development during initial public
consultations, extensive media coverage of the potential harms of intensified
development spurred strong resistance in many suburban areas, as well as the
central government (Ministry for the Environment, 2013; Salmon, 2016). Heated350
debates on whether Auckland should grow up versus out reflected a character-
istic post-suburban tension between the preservation of the existing suburban
environment and the accommodation of new growth (Phelps et al., 2010).
The PAUP received over 13,200 submissions, and the notified plan was re-
leased to the public in August 2016. The Independent Hearings Panel recom-355
mended to increase zoning to allow for an additional 400,000 dwellings: 64%
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within the existing urban area, 33% in new urban areas, and 3% in rural areas.
The plan adopted by Auckland Council in August 2016 largely accepted the
recommendations of the Independent Hearings Panel. Notable changes from
the PAUP included the removal of the retained affordable housing provisions,360
in favour of a mandatory affordability requirement for future zoning changes,
and a bonus-based mechanism for land developed under existing zoning rules.
Zoning for intensification was concentrated predominantly outside Auckland’s
isthmus, protecting the interests of existing residents in many inner suburbs.
The politics of post-suburban development depart from the traditional mod-365
els for urban politics, which are dominated by landed interests. As suburban ar-
eas evolve into employment centres, a broader range of political interests emerge
and land is valued for its long-term use value alongside the potential for financial
gain Phelps2006,Phelps2011. While the outcomes of Auckland’s Unitary Plan
appear to support the urban growth machine theory of landed interests domi-370
nating urban politics, the politics around the Unitary Plan’s process and public
debates suggest a shift toward post-suburban politics. The interests of business
and civil society groups show how the shifting use value of post-suburban land,
climate change risks and traffic congestion (side effects of second modernity
(Beck, 1992)), are politicised.375
For example, Auckland’s Chamber of Commerce advocated for accelerated
release of business land to enable future expansion. This shows potential compe-
tition between residential and business land in suburban areas, as both look to
expand supply in an effort to maintain competitive or affordable prices for firms
and households respectively. Civil society groups were also active in the Uni-380
tary Plan process, providing a counter narrative to the media, business groups
and anti-growth residential interests. Alternative visions were shaped by pro-
gressive urban planning approaches and explicitly targeted global imperatives
for climate change mitigation and sustainable development. Climate change
advocacy group, Generation Zero, garnered considerable public support and ef-385
fectiveness in facilitating public submissions on the Unitary Plan. Countering
the arguments of landed interests, these advocates provided a strong influence
through local media, also participating in public forums and debates.
2.2.2. Infrastructure politics
The politics of infrastructure frequently come to the fore in post-suburban390
development, and for Auckland transport infrastructure decision-making was
strongly contested across local and central government actors (Young & Keil,
2014). Auckland’s new governance structure rescaled institutional arrangements
for infrastructure delivery. Creation of council-controlled organisations for the
delivery of transport, water and wastewater infrastructure avoided unneces-395
sary duplication across different providers and improved the co-ordination of
planning across the metropolitan area. As discussed in the previous section,
transport in Auckland is dominated by private vehicle travel despite relative
improvements in public transport patronage over the past decade. There is es-
tablished institutional lock-in to the “predict and provide” model for private400
vehicle travel, although comparison of local and national transport policies sug-
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gests this is more dominant for national transport agencies (Hickman et al.,
2014; Imran & Pearce, 2015b; Mees & Dodson, 2007).
A key element of the Auckland Plan’s proposed transport investment is the
City Rail Link (CRL), an underground rail tunnel extending the existing net-405
work in the city centre, creating a loop and doubling the peak-hour capacity
of the existing rail network. The 3.4 km link had been proposed, in various
forms, for over 100 years, delayed many times due a lack of funding or politi-
cal will (Edgar, 2012; Newns et al., 2015). In the current regulatory context,
funding raised locally was not sufficient to pay for the estimated NZ$2.5 billion410
(US$1.8 billion) cost3 . Auckland Council unsuccessfully petitioned the cen-
tral government to share the cost of the CRL in 2010. The central government
initially disputed the proposed benefits of economic agglomeration set out in
the project’s business case (Joyce, 2010). Ongoing campaigning for the project
eventually led to a conditional funding commitment in 2013. The central gov-415
ernment agreed to provide a 50% share of funding to begin construction in 2020.
The option to start construction earlier was conditional on targets set for in-
creased rail patronage and employment growth in the city centre. In January
2016, the central government announced their decision to bring forward funding
assistance for the NZ$2.5 billion project to begin in 2018, to provide certainty420
for investors with large developments planned along the CRL route (Ministry
of Transport, 2015). The flexibility of the central government’s rationale for
allocating funding to the CRL shows the inconsistency in state interventions
and shifting justifications for major public investments. Within Auckland, this
is contributing to the variegated nature of the city’s urban form. Fig. 3 illus-425
trates the divergent transport planning approaches shaping Auckland’s spatial
development. Extensive motorway expansion in some areas contrasts with new
cycling infrastructure, shared spaces and safer pedestrian environments in oth-
ers. Integrated planning across transport modes is essential to ensure that the
benefits of local public transport, walking and cycling infrastructure are dis-430
tributed across all areas of the city.
2.2.3. Rescaling across the local and central state
The creation of Auckland Council also shifted the balance of power within
New Zealand’s national political economy. Auckland Council’s constituents rep-
resent a substantial proportion of the national voter base, and Auckland’s local435
issues are liable to shift to the national political agenda, potentially to the dis-
advantage of smaller cities and rural areas. The Royal Commission highlighted
the importance of Auckland working collaboratively with central government
(P.Salmon et al., 2009). Recommendations for a Cabinet Committee and Minis-
ter for Auckland within central government, to improve inter-agency integration,440
3Auckland’s transport is funded through a combination of property rates, user fees and
regulatory charges, and contributions from the National Land Transport Fund. The National
Land Transport Fund is collected centrally, primarily from petrol excise duty and road user
charges
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(a) Great North Road Interchange
Image: New Zealand Transport Agency
(b) Shared space, Elliott Street
Image: Boffa Miskell
(c) Karangahape Road cycleway (pro-
posed). Image: Auckland Transport
(d) Neilson Street Interchange (proposed)
Image: New Zealand Transport Agency
Figure 3: Contrasting transport planning approaches across Auckland
were not adopted in the 2010 reforms (McFarlane et al., 2015).
Discord between Auckland’s local governance and the National-led central
government was notably contentious for housing and urban planning policies,
centred on the need to support future growth, with sharply increasing property
prices in Auckland’s residential market. Between 2012 and 2016 the average445
house price in Auckland increased from NZ$562,000 to NZ$956,000 (REINZ,
2016). The state’s response to this market shift characterises the influence the
local and central state actors in post-suburbia and the in-between-ness of post-
suburban development. Intervention by the central government in the housing
market between 20132016 reflected the uncertain roles across governing institu-450
tions.
Auckland Council’s first strategic spatial plan envisaged a compact city,
with targeted intensification and redevelopment across the city’s centre and sub-
centres. In light of the rapidly-rising property values in Auckland, the central
government was not fully supporting of this approach. The central government455
response was informed by a housing affordability metric which assumes a trade-
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off between housing affordability and planning restrictions (Murphy, 2014; Qian,
2010). Additional evidence suggests that an asset bubble may also have con-
tributed to price increases, indicated by disproportionate growth of property
values relative to rents (Greenaway-McGrevy & Phillips, 2015). The central460
government primarily adopted supply-side measures to reduce the rate of house
price increases, although interventions by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand
went some way to address demand-side factors and limit macro-economic risks
(RBNZ, 2015). The Special Housing Areas Act and Auckland Housing Ac-
cord (AHA) were introduced to facilitate an increased supply of dwellings, on465
the basis that Auckland’s local planning rules were too stringent and the chief
cause of rising property values (Productivity Commission, 2012). These mecha-
nisms enabled more permissive regulations to grant resource consents, and des-
ignated tranches of land within and outside the existing city limits to increase
land supply. Development in Special Housing Areas (SHAs) was required to470
meet affordability provisions for a certain share of new dwellings. While the
AHA and SHAs were promoted as collaborative efforts across central and local
government, public criticism of Auckland’s planning policies by central gov-
ernment reveal conflicting values and political interests (Murphy, 2016). To
April 2016, the Auckland Housing Accord has delivered approximately 30,400475
dwelling consents although only 1000 houses have been constructed (Auckland
Council, 2016a). Conditions for affordability in SHAs are determined by median
house prices: with either 10% of dwellings less than 75% of the median house
price, or 5% of dwellings at a price that can be purchased on a median house-
hold income, given current mortgage rates and deposit requirements (Auckland480
Council, 2014). Given the rapid rate at which property values are increasing,
the effectiveness of affordability targets linked to the median price is limited.
The supply-side approach taken to address Auckland’s housing has been slow
to tangibly increase the housing supply, or mitigate the growth of a housing
market bubble.485
3. Scaling in the post-suburban polity
Auckland’s amalgamated governance model had profound implications for
the city’s spatial development. The scaling of governance relates to a dynamic
process where the allocation of authority, decision making powers and account-
ability are subject to continuous change, being renegotiated, challenged and re-490
formed by actors and institutions both within and external to a city (MacLeod
& Goodwin, 1999). Amalgamation provided the platform for a new policy
agenda, orienting planning and investment around the goal of becoming the
world’s most liveable city. Governance reform also shifted the drivers of change
and their scale of influence: delivery of core infrastructure services by dedicated495
CCOs re-oriented planning and investment around strategic regional issues, and
the unitary council developed a long term, strategic spatial plan to co-ordinate
growth. Auckland’s amalgamation also impacted New Zealand’s national po-
litical economy. Auckland’s dominance as a population and economic centre
blurs the distinction between local and national issues is unclear and in several500
14
cases, leading to greater central government influence in local matters (Murphy,
2016). The ongoing re-allocation of responsibilities and decision-making powers
between Auckland Council and the central government since 2010 reflect the
continuous, incremental nature of rescaling in New Zealand.
Auckland’s politics show the interplay between rescaling and the post-suburban505
nature of development. Prior to amalgamation, Auckland’s fragmented gover-
nance structure led to political gridlock in planning for future growth and co-
ordinating the required infrastructure investments . While a regional authority
existed prior to 2010, its responsibilities and functions for spatial planning and
infrastructure provision were re-allocated to local authorities or corporatised510
entities, effectively hollowing out the institution (Memon et al., 2007). Amal-
gamation to create a unitary council shifted authority and legitimacy back to
a region-wide entity, in an attempt to overcome the tension between accom-
modating growth and preserving the amenity of the existing environment. A
single authority responsible for accommodating growth through strategic spatial515
planning and infrastructure investment internalised the burden of future growth
where it was formerly externalised by the city’s seven city and district councils.
However scaling up other complex processes, particularly public consultation
and consensus-building has proven to be challenging.
Intervention from the central government was catalysed by the housing mar-520
ket conditions, with the introduction of mechanisms such as the Auckland Hous-
ing Accord and Special Housing Areas to increase the city’s housing supply. A
new national policy on urban development capacity will ensure that the central
government have an ongoing role in governing urban growth. The draft Policy
Statement issued in 2016 suggested that local authorities in high-growth areas525
can maintain an over-supply of developable land, based on population projec-
tions and housing and business land assessments (Ministry for the Environment,
2016).
4. Conclusions
An earlier city profile in 1989 questioned whether Auckland would decide530
whether to strive for international status using the catch cry of market led
efficiency , or shift the focus to emerging social inequalities and deprivation
(Chalmers & Hall, 1989). 27 years later, Auckland’s amalgamation and goals
for improved liveability show that the imperative for international significance is
now undisputed. However the shifting urban agenda and rhetoric implies that535
this no longer rests solely on market performance but also on quality of life,
despite potentially limitations in the concept of ”liveability”. Auckland exem-
plifies how global liveability rankings and quality of life surveys have introduced
new outcomes to the domain of what is governable (Rydin, 2007), with signifi-
cant impacts on the governance arrangements and development of urban policy540
in cities worldwide (Bunnell, 2015). Critical reflection suggests that Auckland
may need to adopt a more inclusive form of liveability, and translate this into
local service provision to make a meaningful difference for the city’s residents.
Existing evidence shows that everyday life is unliveable for growing numbers of
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Aucklanders and improving this will be an important test for the city’s gover-545
nance.
Post-suburban development presents a challenge to the city centre, with
greater economic gravity in suburban areas. Auckland’s city centre has grown
dramatically over the past two decades, however it remains dwarfed by the re-
mainder of the city, with a 16% share of employment (Statistics New Zealand,550
2013). Auckland’s amalgamation in 2010, and the subsequent scaling of gov-
ernance across local and central government, illustrate the challenges of post-
suburban growth and interdependence between urban politics, spatial planning
and infrastructure provision. Following major reform, some fine-tuning and in-
stitutional learning in Auckland’s governance is to be expected, as organisations555
test new planning strategies, and adapt to unanticipated circumstances brought
on by housing market volatility. The contingent and shifting balance of power
across local and central state actors has shaped Auckland’s post-suburban pol-
itics. Uncoordinated intervention and retreat in housing and transport policy
limited the authority and legitimacy of Auckland’s new local governance to take560
major decisions. However at key moments, power has been ceded to Auckland
Council, such as the approval of the City Rail Link. Unfortunately, interven-
tions over the course of the Unitary Plan’s development have created greater
peripheral expansion in Auckland, and limited intensification in existing sub-
urbs that are served by transit networks and significantly closer to employment565
centres and community services. The politics of infrastructure may be further
exacerbated by planned expansion of Auckland’s boundaries and substantial
transport investment required to serve new suburbs.
The broader range of interests involved in urban politics signal a shift in
Auckland’s development. Civil society groups, leveraging the internet and social570
media to disseminate information and advocate for change. These actors have
effectively introduced counter-narratives and promoted urban development that
addresses the side effects of second modernity, targeting climate change and sus-
tainable urban development. Poor voter turnout in the 2013 and 2016 elections
show there is continued need to improve public engagement and understanding575
of what is at stake in Auckland’s development.
The state of Auckland’s housing market may continue to be the dominant
driver of urban politics. There is growing risk of a market correction in house
prices, which would impact household wealth, local government revenues and
the fiscal stability of New Zealand’s economy. Despite the city’s challenges,580
Auckland Council has maintained stability to prevent secession from the new
jurisdiction and ongoing cooperation with the central government will help reach
a balanced allocation of decision-making and responsibility across governance
scales.
——————–585
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